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1995
Eastern Daily Press
Part 3
A well-defended shame ?
Singapore legacy: more than 100,000 British and Commonwealth soldiers were forced to endure three and a half years of brutal captivity after the fall of Singapore. Was Churchill the man most to blame for the debacle which cost the lives of thousands of servicemen, including many East Anglians ?
On February 15, 1942, more than 100,000 British and Commonwealth soldiers surrendered when Singapore fell to a numerically inferior Japanese army. It was the biggest disaster in British military history. In the final instalment of our three part investigation into the sacrifice of thousands of East Anglian soldiers, STEVE SNELLING examines the findings in a remarkable new book which is published today
Hidden away in some dark corner of the Public Record Office lies a report, the contents of which are considered so politically sensitive and so potentially damaging that bureaucrats have decreed it must remain a closely-guarded secret half a century after it was compiled.
The report’s title is deceptively dull. It is simply called: “Implications of a Public Inquiry into the Fall of Singapore”.
Fifty-three years after the humiliating defeat which marked a turning point in the history of Britain’s Far Eastern empire, it is fascinating to speculate on the findings contained within this highly important historical document.
Given the circumstances at the time the report was prepared, it is possible to make educated guesses as to what some of these implications may have been.
 High on the list would have been the impact on morale, both civilian and military, if the full facts were known. Then there would have been the potential harm done to already strained alliances, But most disturbing of all would have been the implications for the nations war leaders, not least the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill.
Even the most circumspect of public enquiries could not have failed to question his conduct and the catalogue of betrayal, neglect and mismanagement which had doomed the defenders of Malaya and Singapore to almost certain defeat even before a shot was fired.
Yet dreadful as these implications were in time of war, none of them could surely have warranted a cover-up which has persisted for more than five decades. - and long after the deaths of all the leading participants. Could it be, therefore, that a more thorough-going investigation would have unearthed far darker and far more damaging secrets ?
Could it be that Churchill, the gambler, was pursuing a hidden agenda in which a poorly protected Singapore was to be used as bait designed to draw Japan and ultimately America, into the war ?
There is, as yet, no firm evidence to support such a charge, but after three years of painstaking research historian Peter Elphick feels there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to make this a serious possibility.
In his new book, Singapore: The Pregnable Fortress, which is published today, Elphick claims that if any one man was most to blame for the disaster which consigned thousands of British and Commonwealth Servicemen, including around 17,000 members of the 18th East Anglian Division, it was Churchill.
Certainly it appears he had most to hide and, as Elphick suggests, it was perhaps no coincidence that he never pressed for an enquiry ha had once promised. Churchill had been involved with the flawed Singapore Fortress concept from the beginning, and he was chiefly responsible for relegating Malaya in the list of priorities for men and equipment behind the Middle East and Russia.
“There is no doubt,” said Elphick, “that Churchill under-estimated the Japanese, but it is open to question whether it was simply a blind spot or a case of him deliberately turning a blind eye in a Machiavellian attempt to lure the Japanese into a Pacific war which would bring the Americans in on Britain’s side.
“Even with Britain's stretched resources at that stage of the war, Churchill could have sent a division of troops and two or three squadrons of modern fighters earlier if the political will had been there, but it was not.”
In fact, the only complete division to be dispatched to Singapore was the 18th Division, composed largely of territorials from Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridgeshire, who had been destined for the Middle east. And even then, Churchill had not wanted to send them.
In the end, as Elphick’s impressive study confirms, they were ordered to Singapore as political sacrifices in order to appease an increasingly anxious Australian government which saw the so-called island fortress as the cornerstone of its defence policy.
When the Japan struck at Pearl Harbor and Malaya, the 18th Division was approaching South Africa, en route to an unknown destination thought to be Egypt or Iraq. It proved to be the wrong place, at the wrong time. In late December, the 53rd Brigade, which included the 5th and 6th Royal Norfolks and the 2nd Cambridgeshires, was diverted to Singapore while the remainder of the division sailed to India to await instructions.
Events then moved fast. By the third week in January, with the 53rd Brigade oitched into the Malayan debacle, it is clear that the defence of Singapore had tumbled even further down Churchill’s list of priorities. The Japanese had invaded Burma, and that was where he proposed to send the remainder of the 18th Division. As far as Churchill and many senior officers in London were concerned Malaya already appeared a lost cause.
That the 18th Division should still have been sent to Singapore, where they served only to swell the numbers of Allied prisoners of war, was entirely due to a telegram from the Australian government which made it clear that the reinforcement of Burma ahead of the island garrison would be considered an “inexcusable betrayal.”
Against the wishes of General Wavell, the supreme commander in south-east Asia, and despite his own misgivings, Churchill bowed to Australian pressure. Thus were the men of the 18th Division written off without any opportunity of putting more than two years of training into effect.
“There is no doubt,” said Elphick, “that it was far too late to send the 18th Division. Had the entire division gone in with the 53rd Brigade in mid-January, perhaps they might have been able to influence events. But it’s a big ‘perhaps’.”
“My research points to a loss of morale from the very beginning of the campaign, and it grew steadily worse the further they withdrew. The lack of air cover, the absence of tanks and the shortage of anti-tank guns meant that by the time Northern Jahore was reached the situation was probably irretrievable unless we could have sent a fleet and more aircraft.”
To this depressing scenario was added an unwillingness to heed warnings, still less to learn from bitter experience, and a level of discord among senior British and Commonwealth commanders which would be difficult to surpass.
Yet despite all of this, Elphick believes that the Singapore garrison could reasonably have been expected not only to resist the Japanese for much longer that it actually did but possibly to have forced them to withdraw.
And he is unequivocal in his reason for their abject failure to do either. “desertion on a scale unprecedented in the annals of the British Army was the final link in a chain of disasters which sealed Singapore’s fate, “ he insisted.
Reports about the number of men who quit their posts on the island were rife in the aftermath of the ignominious surrender. They appeared in countless accounts prepared by officers eho formed official escape perties, including one by Major Arthur Stacy of the 6th Royal Norfolks. They revealed that overwhelming majority of deserters were Australian, although British and Indian troops were also involved.
Despite attempts by the Australian commander, who had controversially evaded capture, to shift the blame elsewhere, General Wavell was clear in his verdict. In his official report, written on June 1, 1942, Wavell told how the Australians had “gone to pieces” and concluded: “For the fall of Singapore itself, the Australians are held responsible.”
The report, together with many others, was suppressed as part of a deliberate cover-up. In recent years documents relating to the deserter situation have been released, but Elphick’s study is the first to put a figure on the number of men, including almost an entire Indian battalion, who deserted their posts. His findings are staggering.
“After three years of research, I have put the number conservatively at 12,000, although it was probably closer to 15,000, “ he said. “And the impact on the outcome of the final battle was immense.”
“Wavell felt that if the island could have held out for six weeks, he could have brought in air reinforcements. If the desertions hadn’t been on such a vast scale, I believe the garrison would not only have resisted longer but would have been capable, even as late as the final day, of launching a counter-attack which could have forced the Japanese to withdraw.
“We now know that the Japanese were at the end of an incredibly long line of communications, they were just about out of ammunition and shells. It was claimed that the island was surrendered because the Japanese had captured the water supplies, but I believe that was an excuse. No commander likes to admit that he has thousands of deserters in his command.”
Possibly the most damaging revelation of all, however, was the discovery that large-scale desertions among some Australian units had begun even before the Japanese landed on the island.
that there were some mitigating circumstances is, however, made clear by Elphick. Not only were thoudands of Australian and Indian troops sent belatedly to Singapore without even the most basic training, but a great many of them were inexplicably placed in positions which were correctly predicted to bear the brunt of the Japanese invasion.
It was just one more catastrophe in a litany of blunders which conspired to send the ill-starred 18th Division into brutal captivity from which thousands did not return.
Five decades after the survivors returned from their terrible ordeal, many of them scarred in body and mind, they have yet to receive either adequate compensation or a proper explanation for their retched fate. perhaps the answer lies tantalisingly buried in the still-suppressed report, locked away in the Public Record office.
For the present, it seems they will have to make do with peter Elphick’s compelling study. It is the nearest we have come to a public inquiry into the fall of Singapore.
Now tell us your own stories
The shockwaves of the Singapore surrender were falt throughout Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridgeshire. Thousands of men from the 18th Division were among those forced to endure three and a half years of cruel captivity.
If you were one of those or you in any way touched by the disaster, we would like to have your views on the Malayan debacle. Could it have been avoided ? Should the 18th Division have been sent to fight a campaign for which it was unprepared ?
Also, later this year, the EDP is preparing to mark VJ Day. Our features will include extracts from an unpublished manuscript by Lt-Col. Alfred Knights, CO of the 4th Royal Norfolks at Singapore.
But we would welcome any accounts of former prisoners of war who have special reason to remember VJ Day.
If you have a view or a story related to the fall of Singapore and VJ Day please write to Steve Snelling, Eastern Daily press, Features Dept, Prospect House, Rouen Road, Norwich, Norfolk, NR1 1RE.
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